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LEGISLATIVE POWERS
N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 9:
A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do busi-
ness. Each house shall determine the rules of its own proceed-
ings ....
N.Y CONST. art. IV, § 7
Every bill which shall have passed the senate and assembly
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor; if he
approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his ob-
jections to the house in which it shall have originated, which
shall enter the objections at large on the journal, and proceed to
reconsider it.
U.S. CoNsT. art. , § 7
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a LMv, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he
shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider
it.
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SUPREME COURT
ALBANY COUNTY
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino1
(decided September 13, 1994)
Petitioners, alleging that the Senate violated the constitutional
mandates of section 7 of article IV of the New York State
Constitution, 2 as well as the legal mandates of section 2 of Senate
Rule IV3 by withholding the presentation of the Maintenance of
Effort Bill #3248 to the Governor for his approval or veto,
brought this article 78 proceeding4 seeking declaratory relief.5
The Maintenance of Effort Bill #3248 was passed by both houses
of the New York State Legislature in 1994, by the Senate on
1. 162 Misc. 2d 398, 617 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1994).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7. This section provides:
Every bill which shall have passed the Senate and Assembly shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor; if he approves,
he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the
House in which it shall have originated, which shall... proceed to
reconsider it... if any bill shall not be returned by the Governor
within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall be presented to him, the
same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it ....
Id.
3. Senate Rule IV, § 2 provides in relevant part:
It shall be the duty of the Secretary to have the journals, bills,
calendars, messages and other documents printed and distributed ift the
manner provided by law. He shall present to the Governor, and enter
upon the journals, such bills as shall have originated in the Senate and
shall have been passed by bother [sic] houses. He shall, subject to the
rules of the Senate, transmit to the Assembly all bills of concurrent
resolutions which have passed the Senate.
Campaign, 162 Misc. 2d at 399, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
4. CPLR article 78 provides for judicial review of respondent's
determination if a question raised in the proceeding is "whether a
determination was made in violation of lawful procedure... or was arbitrary
and capricious or an abuse of discretion." N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 7803(3)
(McKinney 1994).
5. Campaign, 162 Misc. 2d at 398, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
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March 8, 1994, and by the Assembly on June 6, 1994.6
However, as of the date of this decision, the bill still has not been
submitted to the Governor. 7 The Supreme Court of Albany
County held that petitioners failed to allege grounds for relief
because there was no constitutional provision, statute or rule
which specifically mandated when bills had to be presented to the
Governor for approval. 8
The court stated that when presenting their arguments to the
court, both petitioner and respondent relied heavily on King v.
Cuoino.9 However, the court does not specifically describe the
nature of the arguments made for either side. The King court held
that the bicameral "recall" procedureslO used to reacquire bills
from the Governor which had not yet been approved or vetoed
were not authorized by section 7 of article IV of the New York
Constitution and were therefore unconstitutional. 11 Furthermore,
the court reasoned that there was no provision in the Constitution
which grants the Legislature the authority to recill a bill once it
has been presented to the Governor because "'[w]hen both houses
6. Id. at 399, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 401, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 264. Petitioners did not challenge the
actions of the New York State Senate under any provisions of the Federal
Constitution.
9. 81 N.Y.2d 247, 613 N.E.2d 950, 597 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1993).
10. It had been a long-standing practice of the Legislature to formally
adopt a resolution requesting that the Governor return the bill to the
Legislature prior to it being signed or vetoed. Id. at 250, 254, 613 N.E.2d at
951, 953, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 919, 921. "In New York, between the years of
1932 and 1980, a bill was recalled.by the New York Legislature 2,132 times,
including 288 times in 1966 alone." See New York State Constitutional
Decisions: 1993 Compilations, 10 TouRo L. REv. 1077, 1080-81 (1994).
11. King, 81 N.Y.2d at 250, 613 N.E.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
The King decision rested primarily on the plain language found in the
Constitution which expressly delineates the respective powers of the Executive
and the Legislative branches as to how a bill becomes a law: "Since the
authority of the Legislature is 'wholly derived from and dependent upon the
Constitution,' the discrete rules of the two houses do not constitute organic law
and may not substitute for or substantially alter the plain and precise terms of
that primary source of governing authority." Id. at 251, 613 N.E.2d at 952,
597 N.Y.S.2d at 920 (citations omitted).
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have finally passed a bill, and sent it to the governor, they have
exhausted their powers upon it.' 12
In relying on King, the starting point of petitioner's argument13
for the imposition of a time-frame for presentment of bills to the
Governor is in the language of the Constitution itself which states
that "[e]very bill which shall have passed the senate and assembly
shall.., be presented to the governor."14 When the New York
Court of Appeals was called upon to decide the constitutionality
of legislative "recall" procedures in King, it held that the
"[Legislature must be guided and governed., . by the
Constitution, not by a self-generated additive" 15 and that the
Legislature cannot "place itself outside the express mandate of
the Constitution." 16 The Legislature, as the petitioner's argument
went, should have been "required to comply strictly with the
constitutional mandate" 17 and, because the plain language of the
Constitution states that every bill shall be presented to the
Governor, the Legislature was constitutionally prohibited from
12. Id. at 252, 613 N.E.2d at 953, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (quoting People
v. Devlin, 33 N.Y. 269, 277 (1865)).
13. Initially, in order to overcome respondent's contention that petitioner's
lacked standing to assert this action, petitioner may have pointed to the
determination made by the King court stating:
We conclude that the courts do not trespass "into the wholly internal
affairs of the Legislature" when they review and enforce a clear and
unambiguous constitutional regimen of this nature .... Our precedents
are firm that the "courts will always be available to resolve disputes
concerning the scope of that authority which is granted by the
Constitution to the other two branches of the government."
King, 81 N.Y.2d at 251, 613 N.E.2d at 952, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 920 (citations
omitted). Without discussion on this point, the Campaign court summarily
found that petitioners did have standing in this action. Campaign, 162 Misc. 2d
at 399, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
14. See NEw YORK CONST. art. IV, § 7; see also King, 81 N.Y.2d at 252,
613 N.E.2d at 952, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 920; Campaign, 162 Misc. 2d at 399,
617 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
15. King, 81 N.Y.2d at.252, 613 N.E.2d at 952, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
16. Id. at 254, 613 N.E.2d at 953, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
17. Campaign, 162 Misc. 2d at 401, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
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passing a bill without then submitting it to the Governor for
approval or veto. 18
Notwithstanding petitioner's reliance on King, respondent also
found support in King. The King court relied on People v.
Devlin19 and quoted that decision as saying "[w]hen both houses
have... finally passed a bill and sent it to the [G]overnor, they
have exhausted their powers upon it."20 It follows from this
statement that the Legislature no longer has any control over the
legislation after it has been presented to the Governor. If the bill
has not yet been presented to the Governor, the Legislature still
has power and control over the bill. If the Legislature still has
control over the bill, it logically follows that it has the power to
determine when it will be presented to the Governor. Moreover,
the King court concluded that there was "no justification ... for
departing from the literal language of the constitutional
provision'" 21 and that any supplementation of the Constitution
was not "the will of the People." 22 Therefore, since there is no
language in the Constitution specifically providing for a
presentment timeframe, the court will not supplement the
Constitution by judicially creating a timeframe because to do so
would be to override the "will of the People." 23
The Campaign court basically adopted respondent's
interpretation of King even though it did not rely on the holding.
The court distinguished the King decision from the present action
18. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
19. 33 N.Y. 269 (1865). The issue presented in Devlin was virtually
identical to the issue resolved in King. The constitutionality of a unicameral
recall procedure was challenged. Id. at 276. The Court held that this was
unconstitutional unless the recall was consented to by both houses: "By no rule
or custom shown, nor by the exercise of common reason, could one house, by
their action, undo, annul or change what both had solemnly done, under their
solemn legislative sanction, according to all constitutional forms, and
according to their published rules and forms of law." Id. at 277-78.
20. Id. at 252, 613 N.E.2d at 953, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (citing Devlin, 33
N.Y. at 277) (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 253, 613 N.E.2d at 953, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (citations
omitted).
22. Id. at 254, 613 N.E.2d at 953, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
23. Id.
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on its facts: "This court has reviewed King and finds the factual
situation to be quite different ... [u]nlike the King case this bill
has not yet been presented to the Governor and the court is being
asked to add a requirement to the Constitution in establishing a
time frame for presentment." 24 Rather, the court relied entirely
on the plain language of section 2 of Senate Rule IV and article
IV of the Constitution. Actually, the court relied on the absence
of plain language. As the New York Court of Appeals did in
King, the Campaign court refused to "supplement" the
constitutional mandate by prescribing a judicially created time-
frame: "[T]here has been no showing of a specific constitutional
provision, statute or rule which mandates a time frame for the
Senate." 25 Furthermore, under section 9 of article 3 of the New
York Constitution "[e]ach house shall determine the rules of its
own proceedings" 26 and the court will not interfere with the
Senate and impose a time limit where the Senate itself has chosen
not to.27 The decision of whether or not to impose a time limit
for the presentation of bills to the Governor is best left to the
Senate to decide under its article 3, section 9 powers. 28 "This
court will not prescribe the specific manner in which the Senate
must present a bill to the Governor .... -29
It is quite ironic that the decision in Campaign, which rejects
petitioner's argument in total, is entirely consistent with language
from King and seems to simultaneously support both petitioner's
and respondent's position. As the King court stated, "[r]equiring
that the Legislature adhere to this constitutional mandate is not
some hypertechnical insistence of form over substance, but rather
ensures that the central law-making function remains reliable,
consistent and exposed to civic scrutiny and involvement." 30
24. Campaign, 162 Misc. 2d at 399-400, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
25. Id. at 400, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 401, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
29. Id. at 400, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
30. King, 81 N.Y.2d at 255, 613 N.E.2d at 954, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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